In many ways, local prosecutors perform often critical roles in the nation's criminal justice system. While a recent, albeit small, surge of "reform" prosecutors already shows signs of abating, their emergence emphasizes a paradox. As Joshua Boston (BGSU--poli sci) et al. note in their recent paper, The Prosecutor Paradox: Understanding the Public’s Low Knowledge About Chief Local Prosecutors, despite the considerable discretion afforded to local prosecutors too often voters know very little about them. Moreover, prosecutors' enormous electoral incumbency advantage only compounds problems incident to voter information deficits. While Boston et al. engage survey data to make their case, one key finding includes: "Our data – viewed in concert with existing scholarly evidence on prosecutorial elections and in the context of our motivating examples above – suggest that prosecutorial elections are not effective in providing accountability in most cases." The paper's abstract follows.
"Most US chief local prosecutors are elected, presenting foundational accountability questions. Prosecutors have significant incumbency advantages and wield broad discretion over criminal charges and plea deals. Our study illuminates a knowledge deficit regarding prosecutors. National and state surveys show that most Americans do not know core prosecutorial functions and cannot correctly identify their prosecutors, likely stemming from poor information provision. Among low-information respondents, job approval of prosecutors is lower compared to high-information respondents. This uncovers an accountability paradox: (1) the public knows little about prosecutors, (2) knowing less decreases prosecutor approval, but (3) most prosecutors are reelected time and again."